INTRODUCTION
The raising of armies for wartime military engagement has rarely been achieved without some degree of coercion. The sudden increase in demand for military labour with the outbreak of war often overwhelms the supply of labour in small standing armies, and it challenges the ability to extend their ranks sufficiently through improved pay and conditions or patriotic appeals to enlist. Conscription, as enforced military enlistment is normally termed, has historically taken many forms such as the recruitment of serfs and slaves in Medieval Europe, the impressment of coastal inhabitants into the British Royal Navy in the eighteenth century, and the raiding of Egyptian villages to seize recruits in the nineteenth century. Coercion into a service that is potentially life threatening is justified by the ultimate national interest of defence of the realm. However, schemes that extend beyond defence or whose execution is not viewed as fair and even-handed may challenge the legitimacy of conscription. Historically, forced recruitment schemes had their foundations in accepted social and political structures and obligations, such as the rights and obligations of feudalism. Nonetheless, in some cases, the selection process was very arbitrary and resulted in high rates of service evasion. By the twentieth century, perhaps in tandem with the development of notions of individualism and democracy, there was a move towards the use of more systematic and even-handed methods of conscription. Often this has taken the form of universal age-based conscription as was the case for many nations engaged in the two World Wars. 1 Lucassen and Zürcher, Conscription as military labour, pp. 406-9; Lloyd, British Seaman, p. 196; Fahmy, Nation and its deserters, p.429 . Although a recent survey estimated that about a half of the countries with conscription schemes are not at war. Galiani et al, Conscription and Crime, p. 4. Where manpower needs have fallen short of universal conscription but remained above volunteer levels, selective conscription has proved effective in recruiting sufficient manpower. Some nations have also used selective conscription to man peacetime standing armies. To avoid the arbitrariness of the past, selection processes needed to be seen as fair, not discriminating for or against particular groups. Lotteries seemingly provided a fairer method of recruitment -their random selection method meant that all potential recruits within a cohort, normally age-based, have the same probability of being eligible for 'call up'. As we shall see below, during the Vietnam War, Australia and the United States both used a lottery based on birthdays, the latter having done likewise in World War Two. Other forms of randomisation have been adopted: Argentina operated a conscription lottery from 1901 to 1995 that used the last three digits of the national ID number. Mexico has had a lottery system of selection since 1940 based on withdrawing a black rather than white ball. 2 However, in practice there are mechanisms at each stage of the selection process that may violate this sense of fair and equitable treatment. To begin with is the selection of eligible age groups for conscription, a figure that has varied over time. Whether the resulting lottery mechanism effectively provided a random outcome must also be considered. Avoidance and evasion strategies are inevitably pursued before and after the ballot result. Following the ballot, only a proportion of those who enrolled would eventually enter active service in a field of combat. This was the result of a further set of selection processes, regarding enlistment and deployment, that were often less transparent and that may have been oriented in favour of particular demographic groups within the age cohort. Since the length and intensity of most wars are difficult to predict, multiple ballots are often required during the years of 3 For a discussion of optimal enlistment age see Levy, Optimal enlistment age, conflict. The probability of being called up, and indeed facing active service, can vary significantly between consecutive ballots depending on changing wartime military needs, the size of each consecutive age cohort, and the predictive accuracy of manpower projections in previous ballots.
Thus, while conscription methods may have become fairer over time, in the sense of equalising the probability of being selected in a particular ballot, the lottery system could lead to very different probabilities of active service both within and between ballots. Even if it were possible to equalise the probability of active service between ballots, no recruitment strategy can equalise the context of active service faced by each cohort, which depends on the waxing and waning of the intensity of the war itself. If military service does play a significant role in shaping the lives of its participants, we suggest that, in spite of the use of the ballot to achieve a sense of fairness, war can result in very different economic and social outcomes for erstwhile identical groups of men.
We examine these ideas through the lens of Australia's involvement in the Vietnam War, drawing comparisons with American experience in the process. The recruitment lottery was designed to bolster Australia's regular army with National Servicemen so that sufficient manpower would be available to participate in the Vietnam War. Sixteen biannual lotteries were conducted between 1965 and 1972.
While selection was by a random process that varied little over the period, the probability of active service and its nature and context changed substantially, an understanding of which provides an important basis for any attempt to assess the economic and social consequences of such a conscription scheme. We explain below the evolution of conscription strategies in twentieth-century Australia. Our focus will then be the lottery system of selection, briefly introduced in the late 1950s, but used more extensively during the Vietnam War. We will describe the dimensions of the scheme through to final selection for Vietnam service and analyse the extent to which it adhered to the random selection principle within and between ballots. Finally, we will assess the variations in wartime service experienced by each of the cohorts that ended up in active service.
THE AUSTRALIAN CONTEXT
Military conscription in Australia did not begin with the Vietnam War. Table 1 summarises the details of Australia's various twentieth century conscription schemes Senior cadets (14-17) trained for 64 hours in more closely organised night and day drills and camps. 18 to 26-year-olds were paid to complete 16 whole day drills in the Commonwealth Military Forces. The junior cadet scheme was abolished in 1922 and the senior cadets limited to 16-17-year-olds. There existed a range of exemptions, particularly for those who lived more than five miles from a training camp, and a relatively high degree of non-compliance occurred with at least 34,000 prosecutions of a total enlistment of 636,000 for the years 1911-15. Since there was no requirement under the scheme to enter the regular army, the Australian Imperial Force Home defence again appears to be the principle although the increasingly global nature of warfare in the twentieth century may have been implicated in a perceived need to deploy Australian troops beyond the nation's immediate borders. In 1957 there was a major policy shift from universal to selective conscription, requiring the enlistment of only a fraction of an age cohort. The mitigated risk of major warfare encouraged a focus on fewer but more skilled soldiers who were trained in jungle warfare and the handling of machinery. Selection was by ballot, a process, as we saw in section 1 above, that had already been used in other nations.
In response to these circumstances, Australia reintroduced universal compulsory military training in 1951. All 18-year-old men were to complete five years part-time service in the Reserve Army in Australia beginning with training for 176 days. 227,000 men served in 52 intakes across army, navy and air force until the scheme was abolished in November 1959. Evasion rates were low, reflecting perhaps the different age groups compared with the pre-World War Two scheme. Although 1950s conscripts did not see active service, in the sense of an intention to engage an enemy, some served on naval ships passing through Korean waters during the hostilities, some were present during atomic bomb tests, and some worked on aircraft that flew through atomic clouds. 8 7 Grey, Military History; Kuring, Red Coats to Cams, chs 7, 8 The procedure used was to select conscripts on the basis of their birth date in the 8 Australian Prime Minister Billy Hughes had suggested a conscription lottery in 1917 the same year as the second referendum on overseas conscription was defeated. Inglis Following the 1957 innovation, selective conscription was undertaken through a lottery. All males were required to register in January or July if their twentieth , mostly for a one-year tour of duty, the rest largely remained in Australia. 9 Shields, National service training, pp. 67-75 10 van Gelder, Australia's selective national service, p. 50. 11 In October 1971, this was amended to 18 months in full time and 3.5 years in part time service. 12 Langford, National Service Scheme p. 369. An alternate number: 63,740 is also given in the same source p.370. and therefore liable to be enlisted in the army. Those whose birth date was not drawn were 'balloted out' and were permanently exempted from conscription. The process was then repeated later in the year using a marble for each date in the second half of the year. The same procedure was used throughout the eight-year period.
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The new scheme marked some important developments in the principles and practice of conscription. The emphasis was now upon service in the regular army rather than training in the reserves and it involved an expectation of active service in an overseas war. The method of selective conscription had been used briefly in 1957-9, as noted above, but it was now to be used for these broader purposes and to recruit larger numbers. The pros and cons of conscription, the purposes for which it would now be used, and the use of the lottery were all widely debated.
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The government was conscious of some of the operational implications in that it would put conscripts, often reluctant and only briefly trained, alongside the regular army with potential implications for discipline, morale, and combat effectiveness.
Training recruits for a brief period of service was inefficient and was a drain on the 14 More details can be found in Langford, National Service scheme pp. Potentially, the biggest drawback of selective conscription was the question of fairness; why some should be expected to serve in preference to others. The 1957 lottery mechanism was revived. Its defence was that it was a form of random selection, meaning that the probability, or, more meaningfully, the 'risk' of being selected for service was equal amongst all 20-year-old males who had not been granted an exemption. Minister for Labour and National Service, William McMahon, observed, "This has the great virtue of being simple, equitable and easily understood by those affected and it does not lend itself to any manipulation".
Nor was it likely that appeals to patriotism would have much impact on the volunteer rate for an overseas conflict that was justified more by the broader geo-strategic implications of the spread of However, the American system had its faults and critics. This was a single annual lottery with a prolonged decision-making process. The lottery linking RSNs to particular dates of birth was drawn towards the end of the preceding year, the ceiling was first announced in the middle of the year of induction but not confirmed until later in the year. 27 This meant a lag of up to a year from the ballot results to confirmed induction into the army. This lag time, together with the descending probability of enlistment as the RSN increased, motivated evasion strategies by those whose numbers fell within an uncertain 'middling' range. 28 The association between RSN and date of birth was publicly known, which increased the risk of prejudicial treatment in the labour market and attempts to predict the outcome of future ballots.
In contrast to American practice, the Australian lottery was conducted in private and War Two baby boom may also have had some impact by raising the cohort size from the second half of 1966. 37 In the absence of the American numbering system, the order in which balloted-in youths were chosen for the current or, indeed, for subsequent call ups remains unclear. 38 Moreover, the carryover to later enlistment of individuals absent from the country at the time of their age group ballot or who had previously been granted temporary deferment further reduced the probability of later cohorts being balloted in. It may have been fortuitous for the government that the probability of being balloted in declined in the middle years of the war at a time when the war's legitimacy and popular support for it were on the decline. Of 224,706 'balloted in' through the period, fewer than 63,735 (28.4 per cent) were enlisted into the army, the rest being subject to exemption or deferment. 40 As table 3 indicates, this figure varies over time, with the probability of actual service declining as the war progressed. This is a more gradual and continuous decline than we found for probability of being balloted in -from 35.9 per cent in the first ballot to 24.1 per cent for the thirteenth. The largest share of exemptions (99, 926) were on medical, psychological, or educational grounds. The failure rate of the army's medical examinations was high and rising -over 50 per cent by the later years of the war; whether this was due to opportunism by those balloted in, sympathetic or inexperienced examining doctors, or tougher requirements as the nature of the war unravelled is unclear. 41 Nor were such exemptions evenly distributed across the population, better educated more intelligent men more often avoided service in this manner.
42 40 The figure of 63,735 is from Langford, National Service scheme, p. 369, It refers to all National Servicemen. This includes National Servicemen men who were not 'balloted in', including men who were automatically liable for National Service because they failed to register and men who volunteered for National Service.
The only occupational exemption was the clergy. Indefinite deferments were granted to married men, volunteers, and serious criminals. Temporary deferments were granted largely to students, apprentices and trainees. A sharper decline in the remaining three ballots may be related in part to the fact that many temporary deferments remained in existence when conscription was abolished. army servicemen (325) from the last birth cohort appearing in Table 3 were not conscripts. Their army location and period of service largely determined an individual's exposure to warlike experiences. The infantry stood to endure the most intense combat experience through their direct engagement with the opposing forces. Jungle warfare, mostly alien to Australian experience and difficult to mimic in training, and with its heightened sense of anxiety of surprise attack, was a particular challenge. 54 From about 1968, the risk of detonating landmines added to the nervousness of the infantry troops in these conditions. Even within an infantry battalion, most soldiers would not be involved in direct combat but instead provided supporting and logistical services.
Frontline rifle companies were rotated for duty. Other army Corps were not so directly and dangerously engaged with the enemy particularly signals, ordnance, and medical. However, combat engineers fulfilled dangerous functions such as mine laying and clearing, while field artillery and tank units also faced combat. That a 'chosen few' conscripts were to be sent to an overseas battlefield for the first time meant that the process of selection was vital to the legitimacy of this policy.
The aim of the lottery was to achieve random selection in the statistical sense of the identical probability of selection within a cohort, in this case of 20-year-old men. This conveys a strong sense of fairness and democratic behaviour by treating everyone equally, although it should be noted that they were below the normal voting age of 21.
Given the growing global reach of strategic planning and military action during the twentieth century, the distinction between defensive and offensive behaviour blurred so that even defence required a more global military deployment.
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63 Australian Veterans Health Studies, pp. 205-6. Much of the evidence for this report comes from commanding officers. Ham, Australian War, pp. 170-1 notes that Nashos had to sign a form specifically volunteering for overseas service but also indicates that many conscripts could not recall doing so.
As was pointed out at the time, however, random also has a more pejorative popular meaning in the sense of arbitrariness. It might be argued that everyone should not be treated equally and this was reflected, to a limited degree, in rights of deferment or exemption such as the exemption for married men. Some observers focussed on the lottery mechanism itself, especially in the United States, that is, 64 The eligible voting age was reduced to 18 in 1973.
whether a physical lottery could ever be perfectly random. The process was modified in the United States with multiple layers of randomness introduced after the first ballot although this appears not to have been an issue in Australia.
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Where the notion of equal probability and ideas of fairness seem to be most at issue, however, was in the changing probability of selection between ballots. In all stages -the ballot, enlistment, service in Vietnam -the probability of being selected (Table 5 ). All of these servicemen were liable to suffer potentially profound and lasting consequences from the experience of wartime service, particularly the small fraction of their number who actually faced a combat situation.
The order of enlistment and deployment decisions subsequent to the Australian ballot itself appear to have been based upon a set of complex and often translucent criteria including appropriateness of skills and individual preferences rather than random selection.
Irrespective of whether the Vietnam-War era conscription ballots provided a fair and equitable method of military recruitment, they offer an opportunity to study the causal effects of service. The current paper forms part of the early stages of a broader project that utilises the ballot's natural experiment properties to investigate the effect 65 Our analysis of the Australian conscription ballot outcomes reveals no significant tendency for dates from earlier or later months to be more likely to be balloted in (results not shown). Close to 3000 individual dates of birth were included in the lotteries and in our analysis. Source: Langford, National Service scheme, 371-9. 
